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This paper explores the extent to which global environmental justice can serve to serve to interpret
negotiations over international transboundary waters. Trade-offs are considered in terms of their
spatial and temporal features, while the biophysical traits of water are found to shape the cast and
behaviour of actors and institutions suffering injustices, or ignoring or opposing justice claims.
Applications of the frame to recent negotiations along the Nile and Jordan rivers show that
inequitable outcomes can be entrenched by apparently fair processes. The negotiations procedures
do not recognize the power asymmetry that exists between the actors, and thus fail on Rawls’
precondition of equality for justice, suggesting that while distribution may be a necessary condition
for justice, process alone is not necessarily so. The analysis also finds that focus on the international
can obscure injustices at the sub-national level, and that environmental issues must be considered
within the social justice context they derive from. One practical implication is that evaluations of
negotiations over international transboundary waters should consider their outcome first, followed
by investigation of the asymmetry in power that undermines the processes.
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Introduction
This paper explores the applicability of the ideasdeveloping around global environmentaljustice to shed light on contested international
transboundary waters. As the authors of the introduc-
tion to this special issue note, ‘transboundary water
justice’ is concerned with discriminatory access to,
control over, use or distribution of the resources
(Martin et al. 2013, this issue). With the existential and
symbolic importance of the provision or denial of
water clearly valued by communities and govern-
ments alike, procedural and representational issues
are also highly relevant to the pursuit of justice. At the
community level, the struggle is over both access and
representation in decisionmaking, where ideologies
clash between those promoting the commodification
of water and privatisation of water delivery services,
and those defending it as a human right1 (e.g. Syme
et al. 1999). At the international basin level, issues of
distribution, use and access are usually not discussed
in terms of fairness (e.g. Frey 1993; Molle et al. 2009),
if they are even mentioned at all, displaced in some
analysis by a host of other geographic and political
variables2 (e.g. Gleditsch et al. 2006; Tir and Stinnett
2012). Justice concerns also evidently fall down the
list of priorities of the security, diplomatic and media
communities who are – rather paradoxically – fixated
on the possibility of water wars (for discussion, see
Barnaby 2009; e.g. DNI 2012).
Research on environmental justice and hydropoli-
tics is combined here to characterise the gap and test
the limits of the approach. The relation of transbound-
ary waters to the developing frame of global environ-
mental justice (see Sikor and Newell forthcoming) is
first reviewed through the particular biophysical
attributes and human use of transboundary waters.
The water consumed in the production of food, and
the international trade of ‘virtual water’, is seen to
shape the cast and behaviour of actors and institutions
suffering injustices, and making (or ignoring or oppos-
ing) justice claims. The potential of the principle of
‘equitable and reasonable use’ from international
water law to inform global environmental justice, and
the inevitable spatial (upstream/downstream) and
temporal (past and future) trade-offs are also
discussed.
The paper then employs basic justice theory to
examine the cases of negotiations over the Nile River
and the aquifers on the West Bank of the Jordan River.
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It finds that negotiations and confidence-building
processes that may appear to be procedurally fair have
led to unfair outcomes. This is explained in part by the
ability of the more powerful actors (and mediators) to
shape the field of negotiations and prioritise those
aspects of justice (i.e. procedure) that will support their
preferred outcome. As we shall see, the illusion of
justice that is created has implications both for the
procedure versus distributive justice debates, as well as
for the practice of transboundary water negotiations
and conflict resolution efforts. It also follows that evalu-
ation of negotiations over international transboundary
waters must consider the outcome of negotiations
alongside the process, obliging an examination of the
influence of power plays and power asymmetry
between the actors. With the claims for water justice in
the cases at hand made from within political struggles
with multiple justice facets, it is also concluded that
analysis of transboundary water justice is better-
informed for consideration of the social justice issues
which others have noted cannot be coherently sepa-
rated from water (or environmental) justice (Tisdell
2003; Francis 2005; Syme and Nacarrow 2006; Mehta
forthcoming; Movik forthcoming).
Classical elements of social justice and environ-
mental justice theory are employed to illuminate the
cases. Rawls’ deployment of ‘principles of justices’
conditions the existence of justice as being based
between ‘free and rational persons concerned to
further their own interests would accept in an initial
position of equality as defining the fundamental terms
of their association’ (Rawls 1971, 177; emphasis
added). The vision is not helpful at the international
level, where the actors are states full of (contradictory)
individuals, and no equality in power or capability
between them is pretended. As Schlosberg (2007)
notes, conceptions, norms and ideas of fair distribu-
tion, recognition, and capabilities that were devel-
oped around the individual do not map out readily
even onto communities, much less onto states (see
also Chan and Satterfield 2007). Hydropolitical theory
may help bridge the gap here, as this has shown how
basin hegemons – the ‘first amongst equals’ – can
coerce the content of international treaties (Zeitoun
and Warner 2006), can employ soft power to present
imposed-order regimes as cooperative (Zeitoun and
Mirumachi 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2011), and can gen-
erally act unilaterally obliging the non-hegemonic
states to react (Fox and Sneddon 2007; Wegerich
2008; Julien 2012). While the agency of these other
states is not downplayed [see e.g. Daoudy (2009) on
the Syrian position on the Tigris and Euphrates], it is
fair to say that Rawls’ ‘original position of equality’
(Rawls 1971, 177) for justice is not met, and trans-
boundary water justice concerns the interaction of
actors, as well as their starting point.
Yet, analytical tensions arise immediately from the
attention devoted to process, which – if not in words –
in effect displaces the basic condition for justice from
equality of actors to their inclusion in a fair process. For
example, Schlosberg asserts that ‘recognition and
respect are inherent preconditions for distributive
justice’ (2004, 519; original emphasis). Similarly, neo-
liberal institutionalist research conducted on trans-
boundary water negotiations has led to scrutiny and
tweaking of the process (see Dinar 2000), and the
design of optimal treaties (e.g. Swanson 2001; Gerlak
et al. 2011). Through his reflections on ‘communica-
tive action’, Habermas (1984) (like the extensive body
of work done on participatory processes in environ-
mental management; e.g. Cooke and Kothari 2001;
Warner and Oré 2006; Chhotray 2007) draws us back
to the middle ground to remind us of the relevance both
of outcomes, and of the processes that have led to
them. The larger analytical challenge (not engaged
fully with in this initial exploration) is to reconcile
claims of the existence of justice with evident or per-
ceived lack of fairness, to the extent that this is possible.
In other words, to test if equitability – and the power
relations preventing it – are inherent pre-conditions for
the existence of transboundary water justice.
Scale, actors, law and trade-offs
Transboundary waters fit under a lens of global envi-
ronmental justice somewhat uncomfortably, and in
places press at its seams. As this section observes, a
number of biophysical traits of water present chal-
lenges of scale, and shape the cast and responsibilities
of actors. They also bring aspects of international law
and views on trade-offs that serve to enrich the theory.
As with each of the other ‘natural resources’ dis-
cussed in this special issue, transboundary waters
‘exist’ in many ways: as a physical resource shared (or
fought over) between states; as a unit managed by
domestic or international donor institutions; in the
imaginations of state security officials; as a subject of
interest for legal and research communities; and as a
lifeline for millions of species and people dependent
upon the flows for their lives and livelihoods.
However, the biophysical characteristics and
human uses unique to water resources distinguish
them in a number of ways. In particular, through the
links created as water cycles through the world in its
three physical phases [liquid, vapour (clouds) and
solid (ice)]. In constantly moving through these
phases, the hydrological cycle sustains the bulk of all
forms of life, and creates interdependencies with
other resources (i.e. forests, carbon), with people
(through farming and other water-based livelihoods),
and between states (joined fortuitously or unfortu-
nately by a transboundary river or aquifer). In this
‘hydro-social cycle’ (Budds 2009), roughly 20% of all
water is ‘consumed’ for domestic purposes – drinking
and washing – while another 10% is devoted globally
to industrial purposes. The bulk of all water (roughly
70%) is ‘consumed’ in evapo-transpirative processes
at regional and global scales3 (Rogers 2008). Any
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interpretations of ‘transboundary water justice’ issues
should therefore be examined in concert with justice
matters related to forest use and tenure (Forsyth and
Sikor 2013, in this issue), biodiversity preservation
(Martin et al. 2013, in this issue), and international
climate change negotiations (Newell and Mulvaney
2013, in this issue). But the comfortable fit with other
aspects of global environmental justice ends there.
A disparate group of water justice articles have
remarked on the dissonance/mismatch between the
geographical scale at which environmental injustices
are experienced (i.e. ‘local’), and the (global) scale at
which they are produced (Sze et al. 2009; Wendel
Wright et al. 2011). Debbané and Keil (2004) rightly
point out that it is facile to view local communities as
simple ‘victims’ of globalising forces, while Sneddon
and Fox (2008) show that groups at either extreme of
the spatial scale are mutually constitutive. The effect
of food trade on local, regional and global forces
makes this point emphatically.
Food trade (i.e. virtual water ‘trade’) shifts the
spatial scale of analysis of any transboundary water
justice issues, because of the pressure-reducing role it
plays4. Whereas examination of international freshwa-
ter justice concerns is primarily regional (the River
Rhine within Western Europe, for instance, or the
Orange-Senqu River in Southern Africa), the water
‘traded’ along with food requires consideration of
the global (e.g. the water required to irrigate Peruvian
asparagus consumed in the UK; Hepworth et al.
2010). Hence, transboundary water justice is also
served by consideration of the global forces of eco-
nomic, institutional and political globalisation, of
international environmental conventions (discussed
in Sikor and Newell forthcoming), and the develop-
ment of an exclusive and excluding body of experts
(Sojamo et al. 2012).
As such, the corresponding set of actors brought
together in transboundary water justice has a unique
composition. The primary actors involved in interna-
tional transboundary water (or food trade) negotia-
tions are the ministries of water and of foreign affairs.
Left out of their quest to reach water-sharing arrange-
ments with their counterparts in the co-riparian states
are the hundreds of thousands of farmers and other
individuals and communities who will enjoy the
benefits or live the consequences of any agreement
concluded. This occurs despite the otherwise well
founded (and social justice derived) expectations of
participation and representation. Even in more-or-less
representative democracies, the public and commu-
nities generally do not expect to (and do not) get
involved. Claims of procedural injustice even by envi-
ronmental NGOs against the state when reaching
agreements with another state are rare, with the very
notable exception of dams5.
The previously noted tension between social justice
(centred on the individual) and environmental justice
(focused primarily on communities) is thus height-
ened. As lead group of hundreds or thousands of
interacting communities, the state as an actor in trans-
boundary water justice issues presents an additional
and diverse set of problems to the analyst. Injustice
experienced between states can be replicated or chal-
lenged between state authorities and the communities
they have the responsibility for or claim to represent.
There is inequitable distribution of water towards the
wealthy in the occupied Palestine territory (oPt) and
Ethiopia, for instance, which as political entities them-
selves suffer the effects of inequitable distribution with
Israel and Egypt. Given the relatively poorly theorised
body of work on the complex issue, however, accu-
rately interpreting the role of state actors into the web
of justice remains a challenging analytical task.
Here, Litfin’s (1997) identification of the shift in
thinking about international environmental issues
from an ‘erosion of sovereignty’ (leading to World
Government) to one where states make trade-offs for
‘sovereignty bargains’ may help. The unreconciled
contradiction between state political boundaries and
resources that flow through, below or above them (as
clouds) is tackled head on by the international water
law community, for instance. This community has
been attempting to move decisionmakers beyond
seeing water under the notion of territorial supremacy
(known as ‘the Harmon Doctrine’) towards a ‘commu-
nity of interests’(McIntyre 2010) that recognises the
benefits to be had through the idea of states ‘sharing’
sovereignty (McCaffrey 2009), much as Litfin had
identified (and Rawls perhaps would have hoped for).
International environmental legislation deriving from
the 1966 Helsinki Rules has evolved into the 1997
UN Watercourses Convention, which developed three
substantive principles: ‘no harm’; ‘prior notification’;
and – to guide the fair distribution of the resource –
‘equitable and reasonable use’. The Convention
expands upon ‘equitable and reasonable use’ through
further discussion of several factors, such as the popu-
lation dependent on the resource, economic impor-
tance, and access to alternative sources. As we will
see, such principles are already in use (to a degree) on
transboundary water negotiations on the Nile and
Jordan – whether or not ‘justice’ is the state goal.
A further contribution transboundary water research
can make to global environmental justice is through
its familiarity with trade-offs. In the highly interde-
pendent context woven by international transbound-
ary waters, any and all actions and decisions will
reverberate for states, communities and individuals
across space and across time. The principles invoked
to guide the bargaining involved during the process
shape the inevitable trade-offs that occur. These prin-
ciples vary, of course, according to the political
context, and are framed by the actors involved. States
may develop principles around what they perceive as
being in their own best interests, or in a manner
constrained by or committed to the development
of international relations, through the well known
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‘horse-trading’ of votes in the UN General Assembly,
for example – or through subscriptions to aspects of
international environmental (water) law.
The spatial and temporal classification of trade-offs
in ecosystem services by Rodriguez et al. (2006)
serves the exploration of trade-offs pertinent to
transboundary water justice. Spatial and temporal
trade-offs are made as a matter of routine in the
classic upstream–downstream dynamic of interna-
tional rivers6. Most evidently, water abstractions from
intensive irrigated agriculture by an upstream state
mean less water available for the downstream state
(and a direct impact on the livelihoods of farmers).
But the importance of the position on a river should
not be overemphasised, and can influence negotia-
tions in more surprising ways. If the issue between
two states is a surplus of water (as for Bangladesh
downstream of India and Nepal on the Ganges
River; Gyawali 2001), for example, upstream
abstractions are not in and of themselves harmful
(though their timing is crucially so). Furthermore, as
we will see is the case of allocations between Ethio-
pia and downstream Egypt on the Nile River, asym-
metries in state power can trump the ‘advantages’
that come with upstream physical location on a
transboundary river7.
Procedure and distribution on the Nile and along
the Jordan
Along the Nile and Jordan Rivers, the relevant debates
reflect tensions between actors who base their claims
mainly in terms of distributive justice, and the poten-
tial arbiters of conflict, who purport to follow fair
procedure. The relation of actors in both river basins is
characterised by extreme asymmetry in the distribu-
tion of water and of power, and water is found to be
one amongst several social justice issues.
Procedure and outcome in the Nile River Basin
The current distribution of state use of the Nile River
flows has its roots in the 1929 British colonial and
post-colonial 1959 Egypt–Sudan Nile Waters treaty
(see Tvedt 2004; Cascão 2009). The latter allocated
about a quarter of the flow (measured at the border) to
Sudan, and three-quarters plus excess flows to Egypt.
It leaves no room for (legal) abstractions by Ethiopia
(whose highlands contribute 80% of the flows), Tan-
zania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and the more (physi-
cally marginal, in terms of the share of their territory
within the river basin) upstream states Eritrea and
Democratic Republic of Congo.
The legacy of tensions created by the agreements is
heard first and foremost in Ethiopia, where the asym-
metry of the 1959 allocation of the Nile is a regular
feature of the press (e.g. Seide 2010). The treaty (and
Egypt behind it) are also blamed for hampering the
government’s large-scale hydroelectric and agricul-
tural plans, and closing down livelihood options to
the residents and developers around Lake Tana. The
trade-off for downstream agricultural use of water for
the livelihoods of millions of families in Egypt is stifled
‘development’ in Ethiopia.
The tensions were targeted in the 1990s through
the CIDA then World Bank-facilitated Nile Basin Ini-
tiative (NBI). In concert with World Bank Opera-
tional Procedure 7.50 (World Bank 2001) the NBI
brought the once belligerent riparian states together
(with the exception of Eritrea) through technical and
diplomatic meetings, and for over a decade halted
the sabre rattling that had characterised the previous
times. Very well supported by European and North
American diplomats, financial institutions and agen-
cies, the NBI established confidence-building pro-
grammes with representatives and technicians from
ministries of water and food or other government
representatives. Technical committees and data-
sharing activities were followed by joint develop-
ment projects in what has been termed a ‘Nile club
of confidence and conviviality among ministers and
engineers’ (Collins 2001, 29). Were it not for disa-
greement during 2010 negotiations over the Coop-
erative Framework Agreement (CFA), the Initiative
would have evolved into a River Basin Commission
and attracted investment aimed at developing a new
regional economic community. However, the CFA
negotiations broke down over a single clause that
inferred potential renegotiation of the 1959 Agree-
ment, and thus redistribution of the flows (Mekon-
nen 2010; Zeitoun et al. 2011). The governments of
Egypt and Sudan refused to sign the proposed CFA,
and tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa have
once again become common (Salman 2011; El
Hatow 2012).
The guidance of the World Bank Operational Pro-
cedures ensured at least a minimal commitment to
issues of representation, transparency and account-
ability on the Nile, though any tensions at the sub-
national level – such as labour justice claims in
Egypt (e.g. Pratt 2007) or the declaration of emer-
gency rule in Ethiopia – were not considered. The
NBI was also guided throughout by the procedural
principles and two of the substantive principles of
the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention – but not by
the principle of ‘equitable and reasonable use’
designed to guide the distribution of the flows. If the
considerable financial and political support provided
by the international community are any indication,
the process was nonetheless deemed fair, or perhaps
‘fair enough’. In not taking into account other
aspects of social justice and the root cause of the
river conflict (the distribution of flows cemented in
by the 1959 Agreement), however, the process was
politically wishful, and turned a blind eye to the dis-
tributive injustice that the individuals, communities
and governments in the upstream states never lost
sight of (Cascão 2009).
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Procedure and outcome along the Jordan River
The distribution of transboundary waters between the
Palestinians and Israelis is as highly asymmetrical as it
is between Ethiopia and Egypt. Counting the four
transboundary aquifer basins along with the Jordan
River, control and use of the waters is roughly 90% –
10% in the hands of Israeli governments (World Bank
2009)8.
The distribution follows the acquisition by Israel of
the West Bank in 1967, and military orders preventing
Palestinian access to the river or pumping from the
aquifers, which are (largely) still in place. The trade-off
of water used in Israeli state-building efforts in the mid
twentieth century is a denial of similar Palestinian
efforts at the start of the twenty-first century (not to
mention the devastating effects on the natural envi-
ronment; FOEME 2010). The 1995 ‘Oslo II’ political
agreement signed between the State of Israel and the
Palestine Liberation Organisation locked in the distri-
bution, and also spawned at least three water initia-
tives between Israel and the newly created Palestinian
Authority on portions of the West Bank and Gaza.
One such initiative was the Executive Action
(EXACT) project. Drawn together by USAID, Palestin-
ian, Israeli and Jordanian government bureaucrat and
scientist members of EXACT have since 1995 been
exchanging data, and ‘building technical capacity’.
While there are many well documented examples
where ‘soft’ power has been used to exclude the
‘weaker’ side from full participation (PWA 2008,
Zeitoun et al. 2011), the process is by and large equi-
table in terms of spending on and official representa-
tion of the (two state and one national) actors. But
the project’s lack of progress on core issues has frus-
trated some international and Palestinian members
involved9. The Palestinian members are, ultimately,
seeking a legally based redistribution of the flows. A
similar pattern (and outcome) exists in the tri-lateral
meetings between the Palestinians and Israelis shep-
herded by the US State Department, as well as
through the Palestinian–Israeli Joint Water Committee
(JWC). Composed of Palestinian and Israeli techni-
cians and politicians, the JWC has been heralded for
its symmetry on paper, that is, equal representation
(see e.g. Sosland 2007). The JWC’s structure leads to
asymmetry in practice, however, for providing an
effective Israeli veto over Palestinian water develop-
ment projects in the West Bank. Selby’s (2003) char-
acterisation of the JWC as ‘dressing up domination as
cooperation’ is now supported by less critical per-
spectives for the damage it has dealt to ‘development’
of the Palestinian water sector (e.g. World Bank 2009),
and the otherwise unfair trade-off is seen as just only
in the strictest utilitarian/Benthian terms (Zeitoun and
McLaughlin forthcoming).
All three water initiatives were meant to support the
broader Palestinian–Israeli political negotiations,
which has led to formal negotiations over the trans-
boundary waters in 2000 and 2008. At no point in any
of the initiatives, however, has the issue of the ineq-
uitable distribution been tackled with any serious will
towards its resolution (see e.g. PWA 2008). More so
than the Nile negotiations, Palestinian attempts at the
development of positive-sum outcomes and benefit
sharing (e.g. Phillips et al. 2009) were grounded in the
substantive principles of the 1997 UN Watercourses
Convention – particularly in the principle of ‘equita-
ble and reasonable use’ (PWA 2012). The Palestinian
position also links the water that Israel uses to grow
food destined for export into its position. Israel
‘exports’ the equivalent of double the total Palestinian
water consumption (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008),
something that has not gone unnoticed by advocates
of social justice in civil society – such as the ‘Thirsting
for Justice’ campaign (EWASH 2012).
The Israeli side has not invoked justice or interna-
tional water law throughout the negotiations, though,
and to date the appeals to justice and law within the
negotiations process (Kawash 2007) have not been
able to shift the broader political context sufficiently
to permit resolution of the water conflict. The asym-
metric status quo water sharing remains in favour of
the more powerful actor, while the consequences are
felt by the non-hegemonic actor – particularly the
most vulnerable communities within it. Viewed only
in terms of participation, the equal representation and
third-party mediation of the negotiations and initia-
tives may be gauged as fair. To advocates of social
justice and analysts concerned with Rawls’ ‘original
condition of equality’, however, they have served only
to re-enforce existing inequitable use and allocation
of the flows. As in the case of the Nile, an unjust
outcome follows a purportedly just procedure.
Discussion
The flyover of the theory and cases reveals several
aspects of interest relevant to transboundary water
and global environmental justice. One is the impor-
tance of examining justice beyond the state level. A
solely international focus would miss the important
(and evident) fact that the same issues of justice that
exist between the states is replicated within them.
Extreme asymmetry in water allocations and water
delivery services also exist between urban centres and
Bedouin communities or ‘unrecognised’ Palestinian
villages in Israel (Yiftachel 2002), or between urban
and rural areas in the oPt (Trottier 1999). Justice analy-
sis limited to the state level would itself be incongru-
ent with the most basic principles of social justice,
and overlook the millions making justice claims (as
noted by Debbané and Keil 2004; Sneddon and Fox
2008).
A second follow-on contribution reinforces the
inseparability of social and environmental justice
issues. Considering the existence and influence of
social justice activists in each country, analysts
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attempting to separate environmental justice matters
from social ones would be as far off the mark as those
who remain focused solely on the international. This is
particularly the case where revolutions are brewing or
in full swing.
A contribution more relevant to this special issue,
perhaps, is the substantiation provided by the cases to
the classic procedural versus distributive justice
debates. The contrast between a procedure perceived
as fair and an unfair outcome of course strikes at the
heart of misconceptions about and problems with the
fairness of the procedure itself. The very different
analyses may be explained by the inclusion or exclu-
sion of consideration of the effects of power asymme-
try. The governments of the basin hegemon in both the
Nile and Jordan cases have employed subtle forms of
power to ensure international donor support and
apparently fair processes meet their interests.
The deliberations on the Nile and Jordan are distant
indeed from Rawls’ (1971) vision of a ‘just society’,
whose conditions for justice go much deeper than the
operational procedures and norms of the international
community. The processes themselves cannot (and
should not be expected to) ‘deliver’ justice, for they
paper over the power plays and asymmetries that can
mock declared intentions of fair participation and rep-
resentation [see e.g. Chupp (1991) on the concerns
over the shifting emphasis of mediators]. To avert the
focus on inclusion providing an illusion of justice,
policymakers interested in the resolution of trans-
boundary water conflict (rather than simply their man-
agement) should ‘work on conditions of political
interaction and designs of institutions rather than
merely the content’ of the process, to paraphrase
Dryzek’s reflections on Habermas (Bolton 2005, 2). In
turn, analysts must examine these conditions, espe-
cially when they may undermine apparently fair proc-
esses and lead to and legitimize unfair outcomes. This
would include questioning why the perceptions are
held so strongly in the first place.
The cases studied demonstrate that the existence of
elements of procedural justice are not sufficient con-
ditions for transboundary water justice. It is far from
certain that they are necessary conditions at all for
transboundary water justice (the ‘inherent precondi-
tion’ Schlosberg has asserted)10. So long as the water is
(perceived to be) shared inequitably, an element of
injustice remains; in other words – regardless of how
well intended (and, indeed, ‘fair’) the process is
judged. In situations as prone to perspective and rela-
tive claims as international conflicts, clarity may be
achieved first by evaluating the case in terms of dis-
tributive justice, and second by considering how pro-
cedural justice might inform the evaluation.
A further set of contributions the paper makes is in
the realm of global environmental justice. We have
seen how water’s biophysical qualities make it inter-
dependent with other natural resource justice areas
(forests, and especially food), such that their total
separation would be as analytically incoherent as it is
impossible. Despite the ties with social justice, the
people who will be impacted the most are generally
excluded from food trade or transboundary water
negotiations. Claims of procedural injustice (in terms
of representation and legitimacy) are reserved for dam
projects, as the focus on local–global causes itself
tends to skip over international causes.
The trade-offs arising from international negotia-
tions are found to bind the utility of spatial aspects of
justice into upstream-downstream dynamics. Tempo-
ral aspects of justice are found to be relevant, both in
the past (in terms of retribution) and in the future
(when unsustainable levels of water abstraction are
maintained). Here – as in the case of transboundary
water negotiations – the interests of the (living) pow-
erful, and power asymmetry vis-à-vis the other (dead
or as yet unborn) generations can undermine or
enhance environmental justice concerns. There is evi-
dently considerable digging to undertake beyond this
initial exploration of transboundary water justice.
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Notes
1 See also the debates via the Environmental Justice Coalition
for Water website (www.ejcw.org), and The Economist
(2009).
2 Including, for instance, riparian position, country size, length
of borders, political system and population.
3 A further environmental justice topic not addressed here is
immediately raised. Acquisition of foreign agricultural lands
(‘land grabs’) may be driven as much by a lack (and squan-
dering) of water as it is by a lack of land or cheaper labour
markets, for example (Cotula et al. 2009; Sojamo et al.
2012).
4 Policymakers and resource managers in countries that are
short of rainfall or with poor transboundary water-sharing
arrangements (e.g. Jordan) might prefer or choose to prioritise
water allocations away from irrigated farming towards house-
hold use in urban centres. Food imports reduce pressure on
both the scarce resource by reducing demand upon it, and on
the state that may mitigate the effects of unfair international
water-sharing arrangements (Allan 2001; Reimer 2012).
‘Virtual water’ is analogous to the concept of ‘embedded
energy’ and ‘embedded carbon’, and as with these other
concepts, it has led to the more practical concept of ‘water
footprinting’ (see e.g. Aldaya et al. 2008).
5 The contrast with justice issues claimed in opposition to
large (and visible) infrastructure (e.g. dam) projects on
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international rivers is stark. Transnational alliances between
communities affected by dams and international NGOs rou-
tinely invoke environmental justice (e.g. McCully 2001;
Sneddon and Fox 2008). Here, the hydrocracies are pitted
with sub-national and trans-national stakeholders, including
farming lobbies, UN agencies, and international financial
institutions.
6 Trade-offs over transboundary waters also involve previous
and future generations. In the most extreme cases, rivers and
lakes can be dried up and forever put out of any ‘benefit’ to
those as yet unborn (e.g. the shrinking Aral Sea; Wegerich
2010). The response by the international water community to
such environmental catastrophes is to invoke the concept
and attempt implementation of sustainable water use. The
fixation on keeping abstraction rates below the estimated
recharge levels may not be as far-sighted as claimed,
however: lakes and rivers developed within ‘sustainable’
withdrawal rates are not the wild and ‘natural’ rivers that may
have once shaped the human–nature relationship so
intensely, but commodities bound and restrained by concrete
impoundments and abstraction infrastructure. The water
‘needs’ constructed by current populations may be projected
out of concern for future generations, but this latter group’s
options for alternative ways of relating to the river are
severely curtailed by the infrastructure and political economy
– the river is locked and they are born into it.
7 States on different trajectories of industrialisation identify the
‘need’ to use a river at different periods in time, and come
into conflict with water use established earlier by others. For
example, Turkey’s relatively late 1970s arrival to dam-
building on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers engenders cries of
unfair treatment from downstream Syria and Iraq (popula-
tions which had grown accustomed to the economic benefits
of their own states’ much earlier development of the rivers)
(Daoudy 2009).
8 The asymmetric distribution and use of water is most visibly
observed in the Israeli settler date orchards cultivated with
state-subsidised water on occupied Palestinian land, beside
Palestinian fields in the Jordan River valley left unplanted for
lack of water (as well as poor access to markets). Documen-
tation of Israeli violations of international standards and
norms related to water is extensive (e.g. Amnesty Interna-
tional 2009; B’tselem 2011; OCHA 2012).
9 Briefing of progress at the EXACT meetings of April 2008
and June 2008 (confidential personal communication with
author, London, 27 May and 24 June).
10 Grey et al. (2009, 19; emphasis added) put it well when
discussing interventions in effective transboundary water
cooperation: ‘process is almost as important as product, at
least in the early days’.
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